

Key Findings & Lessons: The First 4-6 Months of the Tsunami Response (Working Document)

Objective of this Briefing

The objective of this short summary briefing is to draw out important issues and (somewhat limited) lessons as they are emerging from a growing body of documents related to the tsunami response. These documents are listed in the bibliography at the end of this document; where available in full they are on the TEC Online Forum (www.alnap.org/tec).

The issues and lessons identified are global – in other words, they have been chosen as they appear across the range of sources consulted. As a consequence the sources aren't referenced individually. Many of the issues and lessons are commonplace and you will no doubt be familiar with most of them. However, the TEC Secretariat thought it worthwhile to bring them to the attention of the evaluation teams in bullet form to aid in your pinpointing key issues for your evaluations.

Source Material

The document is drawn from a total of 27 documents. These range from a small number of evaluations to lessons learned workshops to a special issue of the Forced Migration Review. The focus of these breaks down roughly as follows:

- Region-wide / global: 14
- Indonesia: 10
- Sri Lanka: 6

Documents come from the following types of agencies:

- NGOs (including 2 DEC studies): 9
- UN & World Bank: 10
- Others, eg, donors & research institutes: 8

How the Document is Organised

Joint evaluation ToRs were consulted for evaluation criteria, and the following breakdown was chosen. This is by no means exhaustive, but served as a means to categorise a lot of information in a short space of time. (Gender and vulnerable groups would, retrospectively, have been better pulled out as a cross-cutting theme.)

Key DAC Criteria

- Effectiveness & timeliness
- Relevance & appropriateness
- Coverage / needs assessment (including gender & vulnerable groups)
- Connectedness / sustainability (including policy coherence)
- Impact

Cross-cutting themes

- Coordination
- Beneficiary participation / consultation
- Role of the military

Key Messages from UN / National Government Workshops

A series of joint UN / national government workshops made the plea for evaluations of tsunami response to:

- Ensure lessons identified have a broad scope and are relevant for more frequent, smaller-scale disasters, given the vulnerability of the region.
- Ensure that lessons are captured, processed and disseminated in the form of **policy advice and good practice** to guide future post-disaster interventions.

EFFECTIVENESS & TIMELINESS OF RESPONSE

Key Criteria	Key Issues
<p>Effectiveness & timeliness</p> <p>Does activity achieve its purpose? Is it timely?</p>	<p><u>Preparedness</u></p> <p><u>Chaotic aid</u></p> <p><u>Agency capacity</u>, incl:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Management, administration & staffing • Efficiency • Timeliness • Logistics <p><u>Roles of different actors</u></p> <p><u>Quality issues</u>, as they relate to <u>sectoral standards</u>: watsan; shelter; food aid; health and nutrition, incl mental health.</p> <p><u>Role of the military</u> (dealt with in cross-cutting issues)</p> <p><u>Beneficiary consultation / participation</u> (dealt with in cross-cutting issues)</p>

Preparedness

Greatest global lesson:

- Key to effective disaster response lies in disaster preparedness.
 - Lack of effective regional, national, and local level preparedness measures / mechanisms greatly impacted effectiveness of response.
 - Disaster preparedness must be integrated into development programmes.
 - Humanitarian aid also needs to invest more in *prevention* and go beyond food, medicine and immediate need.
- Lack of regional, national, and local warning systems increase damage and loss of life.
- Level of risk awareness was low **yet** risk awareness is proven to save lives. Public awareness and education helps protect people and property.
- Donor funds need to include prevention in aid packages.
- Building preparedness capacity best supports coordination during emergency response.

Chaotic aid

- Adverse impact of unsolicited, inappropriate donations from all. In particular, non-skilled well-wishers without prior experience; coordination of such people placed strain on local and national authorities. Didn't follow established standards and guidelines on provision of humanitarian action (HA) raising accountability concerns.
- Even orgs with long history of involvement in humanitarian operations at times took initiatives without prior consultation with partners; in some case by-passed government. Impact was to reduce effectiveness of government.

Agency Capacity

- Tension between emergency relief and development goals can limit effectiveness and cohesiveness among staff.
- Decentralisation is key to effective response. ALSO: strong leadership at country level is key to the overall quality of response. **But** decentralisation is only viable if there is a coherent national policy framework.
- **Staffing:** A strong orientation to mandates, humanitarian goals and duties greatly assists with staff motivation, as does consistency in leadership and equitable payments and benefits. Staff with local knowledge are critical to addressing cultural and language barriers.

Efficiency

- The response was generally supply-led. When emergency response resources are plentiful, the tendency to dump services and inputs or provide more than can be effectively used should be curbed through coordination and careful assessment of needs, and including communities in the process.
- Weak, slow and unnecessarily bureaucratic procurement practices create barriers to effective end use of services and drain staff energies for program implementation.

Logistics

- Logistics plays a critical role in disaster response, yet there's a serious lack of training in this area. Infrastructure not part of donations; need to direct resources to training; might help change entire culture of emergency relief.

Role of different actors

- Essential that the UN plays catalytic role in partnership with other agencies and in support of government in terms of strategic planning, policy and coordination. A number of reports felt this to be more important than direct project implementation.

Quality Issues

- Reports suggested that humanitarian effectiveness is threatened by the struggle to maintain standards due to the shortage of staff. **Or** was it that agencies did not have the staff to match the supply of funds?
- Expectations need to be managed. This is a particular problem in the recovery phase which normally proceeds much more slowly than the relief phase, against a background in which communities have become used to the quick rhythm of the relief phase.
- Nothing replaces presence: establishing field offices early on in remote areas makes enormous difference to quality of response.
- The quality of services supplied to IDPs is of particular concern.

See **Annex 1** for particular issues as they relate to watsan, shelter, food aid and health.

RELEVANCE / APPROPRIATENESS

Key Criteria	Key Issues
<p>Relevance and appropriateness</p> <p>Are programmes in line with local needs? Relevance relates to program goals; appropriateness to inputs & activities</p> <p><u>Note:</u> Under leadership of UNDP and FAO. Oxfam and Mercy Corps considered to be at forefront of livelihoods work.</p>	<p>Livelihood recovery</p> <p>Food relief</p> <p>Cash for work etc</p> <p>Role of the media</p> <p>Peace-building / conflict sensitive programming</p> <p>Monitoring and evaluation – dealt with in impact</p>

Livelihood recovery

- Livelihood recovery is a key component of disaster response.
- Beneficiary consultation and participation will lead to the most relevant / appropriate response.
- Local NGOs can help outside agencies. Contact with local NGOs in early stages of livelihoods planning is particularly appropriate.

Food relief

- Food relief is not appropriate in locations where there is good access to markets, especially as it can be negative for markets. (There's a concern that WFP will do this until December.)
- The prevailing idea that nutrition is compromised if food is replaced with vouchers or cash needs to be researched, as this increasingly shown not to be the case. (**But** there is good evidence from the US that changing from food stamps to cash payments led to worsening family nutrition)

Cash for work issues

- CFW: this is a short-term solution that should be replaced by sustainable livelihoods options. This is important because:
 - As CFW decreases, jealousy and dependency issues occur.
 - It doesn't reach the most vulnerable.
- On deciding what type of programme to provide there needs to be a distinction between different target groups and objectives. Vouchers are seen as more appropriate when need to cover basic needs. Cash notes may be the best voucher.
- Purchasing power using CFW shows how people support re-emerging local traders.
- In some cases CFW is associated with higher than normal payment rates which have made it difficult for local enterprises to recruit workers. Artificially high wages distort the labour market and indigenous businesses can't employ local labour and therefore can't resume their own livelihood activities. (On the other hand, market rates are barely enough to live on.)
- Self-targeting is key in CFW programs.
- Use of local banking systems to disburse cash can reduce risk; is quick; aids transparency and accountability; and leads to a reduced workload for NGOs (eg, SC-UK and BRCS)

- Cash grants are very important for host families; only SDC did this (for families hosting IDPs).
- Clear need for organisations to enhance access to micro-finance. HOWEVER, communities shouldn't be limited to one option only – credit – for replacing assets; should also have right to a cash-grant for this. Need to beware catching people in a debt trap to replace assets. Microfinance schemes need an insurance component to allow debts to be written off in case of disaster.

Lessons: During emergency phase

- Communities need to be informed of benefits and limitations of CFW.
- Agencies need to promote community ownership of program through real participation. Meetings in camps should focus on helping people organise themselves.
- Helpful to identify potential community coordinators as well as be aware of what other agencies are doing.
- Cash for planning is seen as a good way of working; aids participation in the planning process and promotes informed choice.

Lessons: During transition phase

- Imp that communities develop their own priorities and set up informal mechanisms to help them face whatever future opportunities / challenges may come.
- Outsiders need to think about development strategies to phase out CFW and in livelihoods.
- Key issue is responsiveness: how can orgs with resources better respond to developments in communities; linked to...
- Internal organisation of NGOs: there is a need for synergy in communication / coordination between agency divisions as well as between organisations.
- In this phase need to coordinate and collaborate on assessments of impact.
- Train local staff to lead these programmes and for community leadership.

Role of the media

- Media sensationalism of disease in particular leads to inappropriate use of funds.

COVERAGE AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT

Key Criteria	Key Issues
Need & coverage	<p>Issues around needs assessment: ongoing; when?; connectedness; standards etc.</p> <p>Information management / coordination</p> <p>Beneficiary consultation / participation (covered in cross-cutting issues)</p> <p>Distribution / Targeting (context analysis; lack of analysis / local familiarity)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gender and vulnerable groups (eg, IDPs, elderly, children, migrant workers, disabled) • Land rights • Host families; as poor / not sufficiently supported <p>Role of the military (covered in cross-cutting issues)</p> <p>Proportionality</p>

Needs assessments

- NA must be ongoing, as needs change over time. Where ongoing assessment is missing there can be an uneven transition between relief and recovery.
- As information needed changes over time the assessment strategies for collecting it must also change.
- Investment in training is essential and enabling.
- Tensions have emerged between those who advised launching responses as soon as possible and those who advised waiting for information to guide that response.
- As the disaster response moves from the initial emergency phase into the relief and reconstruction phase, more detailed information is needed to plan appropriate responses. On day one everyone needs food, water, shelter, and clothing; but as time moves on families meet some of their own needs, so one size fits all responses become more and more inappropriate.
- Assessors should consult local colleagues and members of the local affected population when designing needs assessments. These individuals are more likely to understand local customs and practices and can help define the areas where needs assessment will be most relevant.
- The corollary to this observation is that there is a need to invest in local capacity for conducting its needs assessments as part of pre-disaster planning. This should include bolstering the technical skills of local workers and building local routine health surveillance systems to include a capacity to expand as needed to address a disaster situation.
- Standards in the area of needs assessment are needed. When standards exist, disparate users of information understand how the data were collected and how reliable they are.
- New indicators and analytic methods are needed to better assess the needs of sensitive subgroups, particularly women and children, and to assess psychosocial or a mental health needs.
- Standardised reporting formats will allow users to quickly extract relevant information from shared needs assessment reports – though flexibility to meet unusual situations is required.
- Recovery programming must be based on sound and participatory assessments of needs and capacities of the affected population. If this doesn't happen it puts at risk sensitive issues regarding land rights as well as vulnerable and migrant populations.
- NAs help to ascertain four main things (HPG):
 - Whether or not to intervene;
 - the nature and scale of the intervention;
 - prioritisation and allocation of resources; and
 - programme design and planning.

Information management / coordination

- Lack of coordination is the biggest problem with needs assessments. Pressure to spend led to limited cooperation on NA.
- Huge duplication places massive logistical burden on key informants, including on survivors who continually had to relive trauma.

- Best practice constitutes consolidated multi-agency, multi-sectoral needs assessments. Duplication / multiple assessments of same thing leads to duplicated service delivery
- Information needs to be shared, and *ongoingly* (including with beneficiaries). Agencies unwilling to share NA reports as they wanted to spend their budget.
- Flood disaster mapping can be used to ID where risk is greatest. Global Positioning Systems (OCHA) were crucial to mapping and accessing more remote populations. This should be made available in all future emergencies – though the critical issue is the sharing of the geographic data.
- Information management tools and the capacity of govt, especially local govt, is key.
- If teams from outside the country are used to do assessments this does not take advantage of local capacities and relationships pre-tsunami, which are crucial.
- If agencies have had long field presence and know affected population, formal assessment might not be necessary – as long as staff are able to gather, triangulate and analyse information. (ActionAid considered to provide many good practice examples.)
- Good assessments require knowledge of the local area, context, and communities, as well as having sectoral / technical expertise in specific areas.
- Only collect what you can use.
- Needs assessments are effective only when they are linked to action. This implies that NA should only be conducted when an agency has at least an intention to intervene. NA should not be used as a “shopping tool” for finding the right community for the agency.

Distribution / targeting

- Disaster preparedness planning at organisational, national, community and international level is critical to identify areas of vulnerability to a variety of disasters; also where especially vulnerable people will require extra support.
- Provision was generally supply led.
- Local distribution systems should be established as soon as possible using community structures. This will help with equitable distribution.
- Not many organisations were involved in advocacy for the rights of tsunami victims, esp IDPs.
- Gaps in assistance have to be monitored throughout the emergency and recovery periods for the evolution of issues that create gaps.
- Agency policy and practice was generally out of keeping with local culture and context; communities were forced to redesign emergency programmes.

Gender and vulnerable groups

- Lack of gender and age disaggregated data hinders assessment and conceals vulnerability.
- In the few camps where data was disaggregated for age, it was generally only for those classified as children.

- Most reports say children are the most vulnerable. HelpAge points out that in one district in SLanka where data was collected on impact it reported more deaths among those over 60 than any other group; and significantly more women in all groups. **However, vulnerability depends on the threat - ie, risk.**
- In general, govt or army camp workers saw no need for special measures for older people. Insecurity was especially strong among older women. The older are also less likely to have documentation and more likely to be excluded from housing reconstruction.

Land rights

- Resolving land rights issues require significant time for a successful resolution which will constrain construction of permanent shelter and cause more dependency on relief assistance. Land rights initiatives should be promoted in all disaster prone areas.

Beneficiary consultation / participation (in cross-cutting issues)

Role of the military (tension in viewpoints) (covered in cross-cutting themes)

CONNECTEDNESS / SUSTAINABILITY

Key Criteria	Key Issues
Connectedness / sustainability	<p>Preparedness / prevention (dealt with under effectiveness)</p> <p>Humanitarian infrastructure / policy coherence. Integrate relief, recovery and development (parallel processes)</p> <p>Focus on livelihoods (beneficiary consultation / participation)</p> <p>Quality of response / sustainability</p> <p>Capacity strengthening</p> <p>‘Build back better’</p>

Preparedness / prevention – dealt with under effectiveness

Humanitarian infrastructure / policy coherence

- Sustainability of recovery depends on an agency’s ability to integrate longer term development planning into recovery.
- There needs to be a balance between recovery and humanitarian needs as critical humanitarian needs can remain. Must make sure remaining humanitarian need doesn’t fall through gap in shift to recovery.
- AND: Remaining humanitarian needs *must be addressed* within the context of the recovery process: humanitarian support must be targeted to stimulate and support the ongoing spontaneous recovery process. Eg, clean drinking water, food-for-work and building materials must be provided in those areas where people are returning.
- Existing local development plans should form the basis of recovery activities. On the other hand existing plans can often reflect the interests of elites.

- It is important to identify those gaps that would cause harm to the recipients of aid and ensure handover of responsibility in a smooth fashion. This can be done by...
- ...having an early focus on recovery – such that it is addressed in parallel to the ongoing relief effort. This will help prevent gaps. Early attention to this helps local populations get back on their feet by providing them with an opportunity to re-establish former livelihoods while in temporary shelters. (UNDP Indonesia: cash-for-work to clear rubble: reduced psychological stress while injecting cash into local economy.)
- Flexible funding of Flash Appeal allowed funding gap between relief and recovery phase to be closed and so raise resources for recovery activities. HOWEVER, those countries that didn't benefit from Flash Appeal (India and Thailand) had difficulty raising resources for recovery.
- Need to focus on recovery fundraising; matched with efforts to improve reporting and monitoring measures as there is only limited absorptive capacity.
- Early incorporation of risk reduction measures: make sure these provide sustainable and durable solutions to address the root causes of disaster.

Livelihood development

- Livelihood development should not be put on hold while solutions are found to permanent shelter – though a lesson from Gujarat was that livelihoods and shelter are closely intertwined.
- Delays in livelihood development frustrates IDPs and contributes to mental health problems. The same applies to shelter.
- It is essential to ensure that livelihoods programmes pick up the shortfall from CFW.

Quality / sustainability

- Certain systems are not sustainable, eg watsan and shelter.
- In rebuilding infrastructure, efforts should be made to situate critical structures in less vulnerable areas.

Capacity strengthening

- Recovery efforts must be focused on providing surge capacity to govt planning bodies, especially in the early phases (Good practice: UNDP support to planning, mapping, governance, shelter and employment, as well as to provincial and district authorities in Indonesia.)
- Local distribution systems should be established as soon as possible using community structures. This will help with equitable distribution. (but communities are not some sort of egalitarian democratic ideal, using community structures reinforces existing prejudices – e.g. low caste groups get nothing)

Build back better

- All actors are not just carrying out reconstruction; sometimes building is for the first time. The key must be to 'build back better' for viable and sustainable development.
- While the UN system has good capacities form disaster response and humanitarian action there is a vacuum re capacities and accepted system-wide mechanisms for post-disaster recovery, particularly those with a risk reduction focus. Gaps include: suitable methodologies to ID early recovery needs; mechanisms for deployment of technical experts to support recovery planning; and for funding key recovery and vulnerability reduction interventions in a timely fashion.

- Must focus on need to empower communities at risk to protect themselves and their property. And ensure information reaches people. Key to this is the design of post-disaster needs assessment methodology.

IMPACT

Key Criteria	Key Issues
Impact	Inappropriate / chaotic aid (dealt with in effectiveness) Market distortions (dealt with in appropriateness) M & E; incl accountability

M & E etc

- Development of detailed monitoring and associated indicators still great area of weakness. Measurement of outcomes is a serious lost opportunity.
- Lack of rigorous monitoring of effects of work raises questions about accountability.
- Results-based management rather than logframes would better enable response to be locally driven by people's own perceptions of their needs.

CROSS-CUTTING THEMES

COORDINATION

Coordination	<u>Coordination: overall</u> <u>Coordination</u> : with different actors <u>Coordination mechanisms</u> <u>Role of donors</u>
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Coordination: overall

- Many new actors. Level of involvement of businesses unprecedented.
- Large number of diverse orgs resulted in a coordination challenge. Lots of non-govt actors with little prior experience unwilling or unaware of need to coordinate. Attention therefore needs to be placed on extending coordination mechanisms with new partners – eg, business.
- High budgets of some NGOs acted as disincentive to coordinate. Even large experienced orgs took initiatives without consultation and bypassed govt.
- Best at field-level where agencies had permanence presence; also when centrally organised; also when fewer agencies involved (ie, once some had left).
- Leadership for coordination is critical to achieving success in all criteria areas.

- Agencies that normally take a lead in coordination also had large budgets, and there is a conflict between the coordination role and the implementation one.
- High staff turnover hampered coordination. Led to loss of momentum and lack of strategic / policy discussions.

Coordination: government

- Often inadequate. Confusion in roles and responsibilities: some governments had clear legal framework and institutional setup, others did not. New ad hoc legislation and new institutions compounded confusion re roles and responsibilities (eg, Indonesia). Government coordination structures are still not crystal clear.
- Allocation of resources and ability to disburse funds was in some cases inadequate.

Coordination: NGOs / INGOs

- Best where govts / authorities took dominant role in directing their efforts.
- Coord with NGOs: National NGOs not represented in INGO meetings / working groups. Lack of capacity at central and district level.
- Significant own funds led to a lack of coordination that comes with funding from institutional donors or the UN.
- Plan for emergency before it happens. Ensure MOUs are in place with govt and other NGOs and roles are defined.

Coordination: military

- Some problems between national and foreign military due to lack of forces' agreements.
- Problems with perceived neutrality of aid given role of military; not enough done to ensure clear distinction between military and humanitarian community.
- Military coordination of foreign military contravenes good humanitarian practice.
- Military did not systematically collect information; what was collected was not made available to NGOs. (However, NGOs did also not make information available to each other – military have trouble dealing with NGOs because there is no NGO Command and Control structure)

Coordination mechanisms

- The establishment of a HIC should always be a priority in an emergency.
- Too many coordination meetings in early phase. Meetings not clearly formulated; not clear objectives; not clear on roles and responsibilities. Too many layers of coordination, too; and duplication. Meetings in English, which excluded local players.
- Coordination has suffered as the recovery process has moved forward (common; incentives to coordinate are always weaker in recovery). It is important that mechanisms established during emergency phase must be maintained and enhanced during recovery. This will assist a permanent dialogue with key actors and so ensure strong, inter-sectoral coordination.
- Various types and characteristics of coordination emerge other than meetings; this has / can contribute/d to efficiency and effectiveness.

- Coordinating mechanisms need to:
 - Determine information requirements.
 - Communicate standardised assessment forms.
 - Contextualise Sphere standards.
 - Delineate clear linkages between coord structures at national, provincial, local and sectoral levels.
 - Clarity government and military roles and responsibilities.
 - Pre-establish INGO coordination structures.
 - Outreach to local and national civil soc orgs.
 - Capacity map high risk regions.

Donor capacity

- Donor timeframes hamper coordination. End up with problems: for example, building transitional shelters without water and sanitation.

ROLE OF THE MILITARY

Effectiveness:

- Absence of forces' agreements constrained scope of assistance of foreign military, making their interventions less effective.

Coverage

- No link between military response and strategic information and planning done by humanitarian sector (most reports).
- The Aceh experience in which military resources (especially transportation resources) were successfully used to conduct needs assessments shows how novel collaborations can facilitate needs assessments (WHO).
- Need CIMICs (civil-military coordination centres) to be established within first few days. Location of CIMIC centres is also an issue

Connectedness / sustainability

- Use of military assets is critical *BUT* efforts should also be made to strengthen and utilise local transport. This can improve logistical support based on local knowledge, bypass security restrictions and help rebuild livelihoods.

Also see Coordination.

BENEFICIARY CONSULTATION / PARTICIPATION

Effectiveness

- Affected communities are key players in early relief efforts, but were not consistently consulted (not involved in needs assessments; planning; implementation).
- 'Consultation / participation' is often geared towards efficiency rather than empowerment and ownership. I don't think that you should single out individual agencies in this general piece.

Appropriateness

- Key lesson from ProVention study: beneficiary consultation and participation will lead to the most relevant / appropriate response.
- Recovery programming must be based on sound and participatory assessments of needs and capacities of the affected population. If this doesn't happen it puts at risk sensitive issues regarding land rights as well as vulnerable and migrant populations.

Coverage

- There is a tendency towards one size fits all, thereby marginalising the few with special needs or not part of a critical mass. These groups must be sought out. Unable to respond to individual requirements, esp in camps. People in camps have more uniform requirements than those in their own homes....
- Assessments: don't take context into consideration, or what approach or type of support is appropriate. Often linked to pre-determined interventions org specializes in.
- Often info obtained thro key informants - the elites. Most vulnerable have been left out.

Connectedness

- Beneficiary consultation seen as key to ensuring durability of all flood relief and recovery interventions.
- Lack of insurance has implications for compensation and reconstruction. Beneficiaries highlight the importance of savings and insurance schemes as well as community led reconstruction and development interventions.

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Annex 1: Key Quality Issues per Sector

Water and Sanitation

- The water and sanitation sector is intrinsically linked to other sectors and weaknesses in watsan sector are evident, particularly in health and nutrition outcomes.
- Ensuring access to water of appropriate types and qualities for a variety of purposes should be a priority for all assistance organisations regardless of their sectoral focus.
- Site planning for adequate drainage is critical for the effective daily functioning of people in temporary settlements.

Shelter

- The tendency of IDPs to move may indicate shelter and land rights issues; these need to be assessed adequately in advance and continuously in the emergency phase.
- Need to develop and enforce building codes in areas where earthquakes and tsunamis are common, and work with government on this. Important to check national building regulations.
- Success depends on: community planning approach and designing to meet local needs.

Food aid and food security

- Free food distribution is less effective as a form of social support unless interventions are made to reduce dependency, offer choice and stimulate local markets.
- When IDPs and other recipients lack information about food aid, its purposes, constraints and strategies, they are less able to prepare to supplement their diets and plan use of foods to fill family needs.

Health and nutrition

- Health care interventions were considered largely successful. However, there is a concern about over-supply.
- Supplementary and fortified foods included in the ration should *guarantee* needed micronutrients for people receiving food distributions.
- UNFPA: good practice in supplying medical kits, incl reproductive health kits. Women and men have unique needs which must be met.

Mental health issues

- Greater attention to mental health issues at an early stage is key to an effective response.
- The massive psycho-social impact of living in shelters / temporary accommodation needs to be catered for.
- Work itself is crucially important in psycho-social recovery (as is being involved in solving own problems such as shelter).

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